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Legal Ethics, Client Perjury and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Introduction
An attorney has three often conflicting roles in the American system
of justice. She is an officer of the court, an instrument in the court's truth
finding process with a legal, moral and ethical duty to prevent frauds
upon the court. She is a zealous adversary with ultimate loyalty to her
client, and has a duty to protect her client's rights. She is a public citi-
zen, with the same duties all citizens have to testify when the need arises
and to help prevent crime.' To resolve the inevitable conflicts resulting
from these three competing interests,2 the American Bar Association
(ABA) has promulgated ethical guidelines, most recently in the Model
Rules of Professional Coduct (Model Rules).3
Under the Model Rules, an attorney who learns that her client in-
tends to commit perjury4 must seek to dissuade the client. If the client
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES].
2. Id.
3. Id. The Model Rules and other ethical codes have been the subject of extensive exam-
ination by law review writers. See, e.g., Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Confidentiality, 13
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11 (1984); Alper, Proposed Client Perury: A Criminal Defense Attorney's
Alternatives, 12 U. BALT. L. REv. 248 (1983); Bowman, The Proposed Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct: What Hath the ABA Wrought?, 13 PAC. L.J. 273 (1982); Brazil, Unanticipated
Client Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence, and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo.
L. REv. 601 (1979); Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidential-
ity: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 322 (1976);
Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting
Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.L 75 (1981); Freedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH.
L. REv. 1469 (1966); Kelbley, Legal Ethics: Discretion and Utility in Model Rule L6, 13
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 67 (1985); Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REv. 455
(1984); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809 (1977); Comment, Lying Clients and
Legal Ethics: The Attorney's Unsolved Dilemma, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487 (1983).
4. Perjury is defined as:
In criminal law, the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowl-
edge, made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence, either upon
oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, whether such
evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such assertion being
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subsequently perjures herself, the attorney must reveal the perjury to the
court. 5
The conflict between the constitutional rights of an accused and an
attorney's duty to disclose client perjury was raised in the United States
Supreme Court's 1986 decision, Nix v. Whiteside.6 In Whiteside, the de-
fense counsel threatened his client that he would inform the trial judge
that Wliiteside's testimony was perjurious and testify against Whiteside if
he testified untruthfully. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
found no conflict between the client's right to effective assistance of coun-
sel and the attorney's duty to reveal client perjury.7
The attorney's duty to disclose client perjury raises questions re-
garding the client's privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth
Amendment provides in part that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."8
Does a lawyer, by complying with her ethical obligations, in-
advertantly cause her client to be a witness against herself? Is the law-
yer's disclosure state action under the Fourteenth Amendment? Are the
statements made by a client to her attorney compelled or involuntary?
What courses of action are available to counsel to prevent a fraud upon
the court, while avoiding "compelling" her client to be a witness against
herself, or using confidential information to her client's detriment?
This Note will examine the self-incrimination issue raised by attor-
ney disclosure of client perjury. It will examine the crime of perjury, the
lawyer's ethical obligation to reveal client perjury, and the purposes and
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. It will then question
whether the attorney's conduct is state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and focus on the attorney-client relationship to discern any
evidence of compulsion. This Note concludes that there is a conflict be-
tween the privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney's duty to
disclose client perjury, and proposes that the attorney should disclose to
material to the issue or point of inquiry and known to such witness to be false. Per-
jury is a crime committed when a lawful oath is administered, in some judicial pro-
ceeding, to a person who swears wilfully, absolutely, and falsely, in a matter material
to the issue or point in question.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1025 (5th ed. 1979).
5. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY EC 7-5, EC 7-6, EC 7-26, EC 7-28, DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), (7), DR 7-102(B) (1979)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE]; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as CANONS]. See generally infra note 65 and accompanying text.
6. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). The Court did not address the Fifth Amendment in its deci-
sion. See generally McCall, Nix v. Whiteside: The Lawyer's Role in Response to Perjury, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 443 (1986).
7. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 995 n.4 ("Iowa... adopted a form of the Model Code ....
but has not yet adopted the Model Rules.").
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
her client her obligation to reveal client perjury prior to their discussion
of the case.
I. Client Perjury and an Attorney's Ethical Obligations
A. The Crime of Perjury and the American Adversarial
System of Justice
The confession has a long history in both Christian theology and
legal proceedings. As noted by Saint Augustine of Hippo in the year 397,
confessions have traditionally helped a penitent to appeal to God's
"pity."59
In the common law courts, confessions were used to secure informa-
tion in order to punish crime. Under the inquisitorial system of justice,
witnesses and criminal suspects could be compelled to give evidence be-
cause church and state were not separated, and because confessions were
less burdensome on the limited investigatory reserves of the state.10
Often witnesses were physicially tortured in the hope of determining
whether they were telling the truth. The accused faced what Justice
Goldberg called "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt."
12
The privilege against self-incrimination arose in response to the ex
officio oath of the ecclesiastical courts, which was used to oppress Puri-
tan and other minority religious groups in England. 3 The privilege be-
came a cornerstone of the evolving adversarial system of justice, which
prohibits the state from extracting incriminating information from an ac-
9. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 24 (Pine-Coffin trans. 1961). Saint Augustine's
omniscient God "will keep record of our iniquities." Id. (quoting Psalms 129:3 (130:3)). The
confession was intended not for the state's informational purposes but to humble the soul for
the confessor's spiritual forgiveness. "I must now carry my thoughts back to the abominable
things I did in those days, the sins of the flesh which defiled my soul. I do this, my God,"
wrote the Saint, "not because I love those sins, but so that I may love you." SAINT AUGUS-
TINE, CONFESSIONS 43 (Pine-Coffin trans. 1961).
10. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 118 n.9 (3d ed. 1984) (quoting STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442 n.1 (1883) who was quoting an Indian
civil officer explaining why prisoners were tortured: "There is a great deal of laziness in it. It is
far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than
to go about in the hot sun hunting up evidence.").
11. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); D. JARDINE, USE
OF CRIMINAL TORTURE IN CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 13 (1837); see also Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896) (regarding the privilege as a reaction to "the inquisitorial
and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in
the continental system, and.., was not uncommon even in England").
12. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
13. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 769-70 (1935). By 1641, Massachusetts prohibited the
use of torture against an accused, but only in capital cases involving suspected co-conspirators,
and even then only until after she was convicted. Id. at 776-77.
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cused person against her will.14 Because it rejects the inquisitorial sys-
tem's use of physical torture against witnesses, the adversarial system
must turn to other means of insuring that witnesses tell the truth. Courts
today use criminal sanctions for perjury to fill this need.15
Perjury has not always been a crime: in ancient times, "our ances-
tors perjured themselves with impunity."16 Perjury was originally pun-
ished in the ecclesiastical courts of England, where it was a ground for
excommunication from the church,17 but later it became grounds for
much more temporal punishments through the Court of Star Chamber.18
By 1563, there was a statute against perjury in England, 9 and perjury
came to be known as a crime against the state. By 1609 in the American
colonies, to swear falsely was punishable by death.2" Today, it is the
duty of all citizens to testify when called upon by the courts, and when
they do testify, they must do so truthfully.2'
B. The Attorney's Accountability for Client Perjury
1. Criminal Sanctions
In an effort to aid the truth-finding goal of the courts, 22 an attorney
may be held criminally liable for a client's perjury on various theories.
First, an attorney may be liable for aiding and abetting perjury, for in-
14. Under the adversarial system, however, a witness other than the accused still can be
compelled to testify. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 911(a) (Deering 1985) ("No person has a
privilege to refuse to be a witness" except where provided by statute.); see also U.S. CONsT.
amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . .
15. The Supreme Court has stated:
In this constitutional process of securing a witness' testimony, perjury simply
has no place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the
basic concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective restraints against this type of egre-
gious offense are therefore imperative. The power of subpoena, broad as it is, and the
power of contempt for refusing to answer, drastic as that is-and even the solemnity
of the oath--cannot insure truthful answers. Hence, Congress has made the giving
of false answers a criminal act punishable by severe penalties; in no other way can
criminal conduct be flushed into the open where the law can deal with it.
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976).
16. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I 543 (2d ed. 1968).
17. Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjury and the Elizabethan Courts,
24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 159 (1980).
18. See id. at 157.
19. Id. at 169.
20. See Pittman, supra note 13, at 766 (referring to the Virginia Charter of 1609).
21. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
22. See Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("This Court long ago
noted: 'All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment
not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate
objective of a trial.'" (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) (emphasis added)).
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stance, by advising her client on how to perjure herself.23 Second, an
attorney may be liable for conspiring with her client to commit perjury.24
Third, an attorney may be liable for misprison of a felony by failing to
report her knowledge of the perjury after having a reasonable opportu-
nity to do so, and by committing an act to conceal the perjury.25 Fourth,
an attorney may be liable for compounding crime when she agrees not to
prosecute the perjury in exchange for some consideration.26 Fifth, an
attorney may be liable for subornation of perjury if she persuades her
client to perjure herself."
2. Social Sanctions
In addition to possible criminal liability, an attorney may suffer so-
cial condemnation as a result of her client's perjury. Mohandas K. Gan-
dhi, who practiced law in South Africa before turning to more socially
beneficial endeavors, wrote that "as a student I had heard that the law-
yer's profession was a liar's profession. "28 As a result of the advocacy
process, Gandhi felt that "even truthfulness in the practice of the profes-
sion cannot cure it of the fundamental defect that vitiates it."29
Gandhi often faced the problem of untruthful clients. In one case in
which his client was apparently lying on the witness stand, Gandhi im-
mediately asked the court to dismiss his client's case. Gandhi felt that
his client would be a better person as a result, and Gandhi himself found
that the dismissal enhanced his personal reputation within the South Af-
rican legal community.30 Another client reported to Gandhi that he had
been involved in a smuggling operation and that criminal charges were to
be brought against him. Despite his client's reluctance, Gandhi insisted
that he make a full confession to the authorities.31
The modern attorney faces a similar choice when it appears that her
client wishes to perpetrate a fraud upon the court by committing perjury.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 64 (1972).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 23, §§ 61, 62.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) states:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the
same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United
States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or
both.
A crime of merely failing to report a crime may violate the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. See United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 1970).
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 259 (5th ed. 1979).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1982).
28. M. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: My EXPERIMENT WITH TRUTH 361 (1959).
29. Id. at 365.
30. Id. at 365-66.
31. Id. at 367-69. Gandhi's client felt that his confession to Gandhi alone was sufficient,
and was "[d]eeply mortified" by the prospect of a confession to the prosecuting authorities. He
demanded that Gandhi seek the advice of another attorney.
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She may say nothing and allow her client to deceive the court, or she
may disclose the information and betray her client. It is not surprising,
then, that lawyers have not always been held in high esteem.
C. Ethical Obligations of Counsel Regarding Known Client Perjury
Various solutions to the attorney's dilemma have been proposed,
each of which has implications for the client's privilege against self-in-
crimination. Some commentators and ethical guidelines call for
mandatory disclosure of client confidences if necessary to prevent client
perjury; 32 others suggest that disclosure is within the attorney's discre-
tion or is permissible only to prevent certain violent crimes.33 Others
have suggested: (1) mandatory or permissive withdrawal from the case
by the attorney;34 (2) firmly advising the client not to perjure herself;35
(3) keeping the client from taking the witness stand;36 (4) eliciting a nar-
rative testimony from the client on the perjurious topics and not using
the perjured testimony in closing argument;37 or (5) insisting that the
client tell the truth on the witness stand.38
Between 1908 and 1970, the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
guided attorneys in cases of client perjury.3 9 If an attorney knew that her
client had committed perjury or intended to commit perjury, she had a
32. See, e.g., CANONS, supra note 5, Canon 29; MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-28 n.49
(quoting In re Robinson, 151 A.D. 589, 600, 136 N.Y.S. 548, 556-57 (1912), afid, 209 N.Y.
354, 103 N.E. 160 (1913) (a lawyer has an "active affirmative duty to protect the administra-
tion of justice from perjury and fraud .... "); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3(a)(2)
(imposes an affirmative duty on a lawyer to disclose client confidences when "necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client").
33. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERI-
CAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Rev. Draft 1982) [hereinafter cited as LAW-
YER'S CODE] (not approved by the Commission, but included as a "Supplemental Rule"; gives
the lawyer discretion to reveal client confidences if "necessary to prevent imminent danger to
human life").
34. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(b) (permissive withdrawal if a
client "[P]ersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct"); MODEL RULES, supra note
1, Rule 1.16(b). But see LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 33, Rule 6.6 (makes the lawyer's duty
not to disclose client confidences superior to the lawyer's duty not to commit a disciplinary
violation); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-1 10(B)(2) (makes the lawyer's duty not to com-
mit a disciplinary violation superior to any implied statement regarding the client's case that
such a withdrawal would create).
35. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3 comment on perjury by a criminal
defendant ("[Tihe lawyer should seek to persuade the client to refrain from perjurious
testimony.").
36. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nor. Nix v. White-
side, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
37. Cf LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 33, Chapter I, Illustrative Cases l(i) (refers to such
an approach); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3 comment on perjury by a criminal
defendant.
38. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1326.
39. CANONS, supra note 5.
duty to "bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authori-
ties."'  Moreover, the attorney could not seek to avoid learning of her
client's perjury, for she had an affirmative duty to "obtain full knowledge
of [her] client's cause."'" Under the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, approved in 1971,42 an attorney cannot "[k]nowingly use
perjured testimony." 43 If the client commits a fraud such as perjury and
fails to take corrective action, the attorney must "reveal the fraud to the
affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a
privileged communication."'  Of course, discussions between an attor-
ney and her client, which enable the client to plan or commit a crime are
not privileged communications, 45 so an attorney would have to reveal her
client's fraud to the court.46
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983, 47
identify the lawyer's roles as representative of her clients, officer of the
court, and public citizen. 48 The Model Rules also state that a client's
confidences normally should not be disclosed without a client's con-
sent. 49 As an officer of the court, it is professional misconduct for an
attorney to counsel a client in criminal conduct, or engage in criminal or
40. Id. Canon 29.
41. Id. Canon 8.
42. MODEL CODE, supra note 5.
43. Id. DR 7-102(A)(4).
44. Id. DR 7-102(B)(1).
45. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (Deering 1985) ("There is no privilege under this article if
the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to
commit a crime or a fraud.").
46. Under the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1980) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS], the ABA House of Delegates
failed to enact "The Defense Function" Standard 4-7.7, concerning testimony by a witness.
Under this proposal, counsel is to "strongly discourage the defendant against taking the wit-
ness stand to testify perjuriously." Standard 4-7.7(a). If such intent is revealed prior to trial,
counsel is to withdraw from the case if "feasible" without advising the court of counsel's rea-
sons. Standard 4-7.7(b). If unable to withdraw and the client insists on testifying perjuriously,
the lawyer must (1) make a record that the defendant is testifying against counsel's advice, (2)
examine the defendant witness only where perjurious responses will not be given, (3) allow the
defendant to offer any perjurious testimony in a narrative after examination by counsel, and (4)
not argue the "false version of facts" to the trier of fact during closing argument. Standard 4-
7.7(c).
47. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
48. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Preamble.
49. Id. Rule 1.6(a). Client confidences may be revealed by the lawyer "to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm ... ." Rule 1.6(b)(1); cf LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 33,
"Supplemental Rule 1.6." The lawyer is also free under the Model Rules to disclose client
confidences in order "to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's rep-
resentation of the client." MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b)(2). This language would
allow the attorney to reveal client confidences if opposing counsel or the judge suspected a
lawyer's complicity in perjurious conduct by the client.
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fraudulent conduct herself." To avoid furthering criminal or fraudulent
conduct, the lawyer must seek to withdraw from representation.51
Model Rule 3.3, entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal," requires a
lawyer to abstain from using false evidence. 2 Under this rule, an attor-
ney has an affirmative duty to disclose information "to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client."'5 3 To avoid using evidence that
she "knows to be false," the attorney must take "reasonable remedial
measures."5 4 If the lawyer "reasonably believes" evidence to be false, it
is within her discretion to refuse to offer it.5 The Comment to Rule 3.3
suggests that a lawyer first try to persuade her client not to present per-
jurious testimony. If unable to persuade the client, the attorney should
withdraw from the representation. 6 These obligations "continue to the
conclusion of the proceeding," and supercede any confidentiality require-
ments of the Model Rules. 7 Thus, if an attorney learns of a client's
perjury after the trial, she has no ethical duty to correct the matter.5 8
For criminal cases, the Comments to Rule 3.3 offer three proposals.
First, an attorney may elicit narrative testimony from her client and then
ignore the narrative in summation to the finder of fact. The Comment
suggests that while the lawyer can refrain from using false evidence
under this alternative, it is an "implicit disclosure" of the client's confi-
dences.59 Second, "the advocate [may] be entirely excused from the duty
to reveal [her client's] perjury."6 This of course implicates the attorney
in her client's crime, for the attorney would know that she has permitted
the use of perjured testimony. Finally, the attorney may be required to
"reveal the client's perjury if necessary to rectify the situation. ' 61 This
alternative acknowledges three rights of the accused: the right to (1)
assistance of counsel, (2) testify, and (3) confidentiality of communica-
tions with counsel. The Model Rules point out that in a criminal case,
the lawyer must abide by her client's decision whether to testify,62 how-
50. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 8.4.
51. Id. Rule 1.2(d).
52. Id. Rule 3.3.
53. Id. Rule 3.3(a)(2).
54. Id. Rule 3.3(a)(4).
55. Id. Rule 3.3(c).
56. Id. Rule 3.3 comment.
57. Id. Rule 3.3(b).
58. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 338 (Deering Supp. 1985) (statute of limitations for fraud ac-
tions is tolled "until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake"). A client's fraud such as perjury may not be made known to counsel until long after
the proceeding is over.
59. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3 comment on perjury by a criminal defendant;
see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 46, Standard 4-7.7(c); LAWYER'S CODE,
supra note 33, Chapter I, Illustrative Case 1(i).
60. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3 comment on perjury by a criminal defendant.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also Rule 1.2(d).
ever a client has no right to the aid of counsel to commit perjury, and the
lawyer has a legal and ethical obligation to avoid the use of perjury.
63
If the perjured testimony has been given, but the proceedings have
not terminated, the lawyer, upon learning of the client's transgression,
must "remonstrate with the client confidentially. '"64 The Comment does
not, however, explain what type of client conduct should satisfy the at-
torney. If the client fails to act and if withdrawal "will remedy the situa-
tion," then the attorney should withdraw. If withdrawal is impossible,
"the advocate should make disclosure to the court."
65
The Model Rules point to three alternatives for the court when the
attorney discloses her client's perjury. It can (1) make a statement to the
trier of fact, (2) call a mistrial, or (3) do nothing. In addition, the client
may argue with her counsel before the court when the attorney discloses
perury.16 This alone would be cause for a mistrial, and as the Comment
points out, the artful defendant could postpone judgment indefinitely by
repeating this tactic.
67
The Comments discuss some constitutional implications of the at-
torney's duty to disclose the existence of perjury.6" They indicate that
some jurisdictions have held that the client has both a due process and a
sixth amendment right to present false evidence if she wishes to testify,69
but this position has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Whiteside.
70
The Comments note that "[tihe obligation of the advocate under these
Rules is subordinate to such a constitutional requirement.,
71
Although Model Rule 3.3 makes no mention of the privilege against
self-incrimination, it follows a fortiori that if there is a conflict between
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the Model
Rules, the latter must bow to the former.
H. Client Perjury and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A. Purposes of the Privilege
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides in part that
"[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
63. Id. Rule 3.3 comment on perjury by a criminal defendant.
64. Id. Rule 3.3 comment on remedial measures.
65. Id; see also Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 995 ("Indeed, both the Model Code and the Model
Rules do not merely authorize disclosure by counsel of client perjury; they require such
disclosure.").
66. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3 comment on remedial measures.
67. Id.
68. Id. Rule 3.3 comment on constitutional considerations.
69. Id.
70. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
71. Id; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which provides: "This Constitution ... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
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against himself."' 7 2 This privilege against self-incrimination "is also pro-
tected by the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgment by the States" 73 because "the American system of
criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and... the Fifth
Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay."'74 State and federal gov-
ernments must "establish guilt by evidence independently and freely se-
cured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of
his own mouth.
75
The Framers considered the privilege to protect only against tor-
ture.76 In the early twentieth century the privilege applied only to judi-
cial compulsion, and not to compulsion by the police or other
government agents; the latter forms of compulsion were limited by the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, in
Brown v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause prevented use at trial of an accused's confession that the police
had physically coerced.77 Due process barred compulsion of confessions
because of a "complex of values": coerced confessions were considered
inherently untrustworthy, for their suspect nature blocked the truth seek-
ing goal of the judicial system; and barring their use preserved the indi-
vidual's freedom of choice, deterred unlawful conduct and helped
preserve the integrity of the judicial system.78
In 1964, the Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan79 held that the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination itself precluded the use of coerced police
interrogations. Thus, the privilege, applied through the Due Process
Clause, prevents state action to coerce confessions."
Today, the privilege against self-incrimination serves several pur-
poses, as the Supreme Court noted in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission:
81
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our
fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness
to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that
self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treat-
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
74. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
75. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.
76. Pittman, supra note 13, at 788; see also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 554
(1892) (stating that the Amendment was proposed to limit the common law privilege to crimi-
nal cases only).
77. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
78. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
79. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
80. Id. at 7.
81. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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ment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the government to leave the indi-
vidual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by
requiring the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load," ... our distrust of self-deprecatory state-
ments; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a
shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent.",
82
Despite the proscriptions of the privilege or the Due Process Clause,
courts by no means discourage the use of confessions. The Supreme
Court has said that it is "inherently desirable" to secure admissions by
wrongdoers,83 and has noted that "admissions or confessions of the pris-
oner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the
scale of incriminating evidence .... 84
B. Scope of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Because the privilege against self-incrimination is a personal right
that attaches only to natural persons, corporate entities are not within
the ambit of its protections." Only an individual holding the privilege
can assert it. As her agent, the client's attorney can invoke the privilege
on behalf of the client, but only for the client's protection.86 The client
may have a sixth amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if
her attorney fails to raise the privilege on her behalf.87 The privilege
cannot be raised by a witness to protect third parties,88 nor can an indi-
vidual use the privilege to prevent the admission in her own criminal trial
of the compelled inculpatory statements of another.89
The privilege has three effects. First, it prevents the government
from compelling the criminally accused to testify at her own trial.90 Sec-
82. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
83. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
84. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896).
85. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1972); see also Bellis v. United States, 417
U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974).
86. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 120 n.6 (3d ed. 1984); cf. Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976) (allows an attorney to claim the fifth amendment privilege to protect her client
only if the client herself could claim the privilege).
87. See Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 993 (for a successful claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, "the movant must establish both serious attorney error and prejudice."); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984).
88. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976) ("The privilege cannot...
be asserted by a witness to protect others from possible criminal prosecution."); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896) ("Every good citizen is bound to aid in the enforcement of
the law, and has no right to permit himself, under the pretext of shielding his own good name,
to be made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter behind his privilege.").
89. But see United States v. Bernett, 495 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (statements made to
two private citizens can be excluded, if found to be coerced, despite lack of governmental
action under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
90. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984).
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ond, it prevents the government from using evidence derived from state-
ments it has coerced from the defendant.91 Third, it requires that
arrested individuals be apprised of their privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and of their sixth amendment right to counsel.92 The privilege must
be liberally construed to apply to all situations in which an individual
could be compelled to give evidence which could be used against her in a
criminal case.93 An individual can assert the privilege in any judicial
proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative, investigatory, or
adjudicatory.94
Weighing against the interests of the privilege is the government's
need for information. Self-reporting by individuals eases the govern-
ment's burden in the administration of its laws: two examples are income
taxes95 and hit and run statutes.96 Other interests are the government's
need for criminal law enforcement97 and the judicial system's need for
every person's testimony.98 According to Chief Justice Burger, there
must be a balancing of these competing interests:
Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protec-
tion of the right against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to
serious questions. Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of
balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual
claim to constitutional protections on the other; neither interest
can be treated lightly.99
The privilege does not always apply;i rather, its application has
91. "The thrust of the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination has two interre-
lated objectives, 'The Government may not use compulsion to elicit self-incriminating state-
ments, and the Government may not permit use in a criminal trial of self-incriminating
statements elicited by compulsion.'" Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 283 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1037, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1972) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964)).
92. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). The Burger Court, however,
asserts that these are not the minimum requirements of the Fifth Amendment, but merely a
"prophylactic" standard. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974) (a violation of Mi-
randa is not necessarily the same as a violation of the Fifth Amendment).
93. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 326-27 (1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 562 (1892) (privilege "must have a broad construction in favor of the right which it
was intended to secure").
94. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). Thus, if the privilege plays a role
in the ethical obligations of an attorney regarding client perjury, that role extends beyond the
scope of the Sixth Amendment, which only applies to criminal proceedings. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.") (emphasis added).
95. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971) (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 433-34.
97. Id. at 440 (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443 (common law principle that "the public has a right to every
man's evidence") (citations omitted).
99. Byers, 402 U.S. at 427.
100. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-600 (1896).
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two requirements. First, it must be state action that compels testi-
mony.1° 1 Thus, there is a question of whether an attorney is a state actor
when she discloses client perjury. Second, the privilege only applies
when the holder is compelled to disclose information. In the attorney-
client context, there is an issue as to whether the client is compelled to
make disclosures to the attorney. Furthermore, the privilege does not
apply when the holder has waived it. Another question then is whether
the client waives her privilege when she discusses perjury with her
attorney. 102
C. Is There Sufficient State Action in Enforcement of the Ethical Codes
to Invoke the Protection of the Fifth Amendment?
The fifth amendment privilege applies only when the government
has been a party to the compulsion of a criminally accused individual.103
101. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 799 (1966).
102. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. at 598. The
privilege does not apply if the prosecution for the alleged crime is barred by the statute of
limitations. This is not a concern when the attorney's ethical obligation under the Model
Rules terminates at the end of the proceeding in which the perjury would have occured. Nor
does the privilege apply if either a sufficient immunity from prosecution or a pardon has been
granted to a particular witness. Immunity, however, removes the primary motive for perjury:
fear of punishment. The privilege has no application if the disputed testimony would only tend
to disgrace the witness or subject the accused or the witness to a civil penalty. For the privi-
lege to apply, the threat facing the witness or defendant must be a realistic threat of criminal
sanction. United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833, 845 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. at 599-600. Such a
realistic threat exists when an attorney is required to reveal her client's confidences to the
court. Disclosure by the attorney provides the state with a "link in the chain of evidence" for a
perjury prosecution against the client. See generally Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. The attorney's
testimony would be highly incriminating in a perjury action against the client.
The privilege applies only to evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, not the
compulsion of physical evidence. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). Nontes-
timonial evidence such as handwriting, fingerprints, voice exemplars, blood tests or other bod-
ily extracts are not protected from governmental compulsion, unless such compulsion "shocks
the conscience'-a due process test. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (opinion
of Frankfurter, J.).
103. Compulsion by nongovernmental parties is not barred from use at trial unless the
compulsion rises to the status of a due process violation. See supra note 89 and accompanying
text. While ordinarily the government should not suffer for the wrongdoing of private individ-
uals not under its control, compelled evidence from any source still has the problem of being
inherently untrustworthy. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). The privilege against
self-incrimination cannot be abridged by the states as a result of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). The Supreme Court has held
that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against
wrongs done by [private] individuals." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 799 (1966) (quot-
ing United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 92 (1951) (opinion of Douglas, J.) (emphasis in
original)); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982); Baxter v. Palmigi-
ano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1976); id. at 332 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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A threshold question is whether there is state action when a member of
the bar complies with the Model Rules.
In our adversarial system of justice, the lawyer is a diligent and zeal-
ous advocate for her client."° This role is essential (1) to provide the
client with every opportunity to present her case, (2) for counsel to be her
client's agent through the complex judicial system,10 5 and (3) to en-
courage the parties to a suit to present their case in the best possible
light."0 6 The lawyer is also an officer of the court. 17 As an officer of the
court, the lawyer is essential to its fact-finding processes.t10  Moreover, a
lawyer's duty as an officer of the court is superior to her duty to a cli-
ent. 0 9 Attorneys must encourage their clients to comply with the law." 0
The Supreme Court recognizes the "counsel as a 'medium' between...
[the client] and the State." 1 '
L Attorney as State Actor
The ABA claims that lawyers are members of a self-regulating pro-
fession,"' which indicates that there is no state action when an attorney
104. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Preamble.
105. See, eg., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.").
106. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1024 (1976).
107. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note I, Preamble.
108. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 46, Standard 4-1.1(a); see also
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978); People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d
514, 83 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1970). Contra State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). See
generally Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 43, 55-56
(1985).
110. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976) (en bane).
111. Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 487 (1985). The prosecutor's duty toward the
court is well settled. The prosecutor must vigorously represent the government, Taylor v.
Curry, 708 F.2d 886, 890 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1000 (1983), as well as insure that
justice is done. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972). The prosecutor also has a
special duty not to allow false testimony to stand uncorrected. If one of the government's
witnesses commits peijury of which the prosecutor is aware, it is reversible error for her not to
take measures to remedy the matter. See United States v. White, 724 F.2d 714, 717 (8th Cir.
1984).
112. The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also
have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this
respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of
government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that
ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the
occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain
the legal profession's independence from government domination.
MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Preamble.
follows the Model Rules. 113 But because state supreme courts enforce
disciplinary actions against attorneys who are members of state bars, vio-
lations of the bar's ethical guidelines receive state censure. 11 4 In addi-
tion, under state law it is illegal to practice law without being a member
of the bar."' Violation of the ethical rules also can be grounds for disbar-
ment by the state courts. 6 Is this sufficient state action to invoke the
protection of the Fifth Amendment?
The manner in which the Supreme Court distinguishes between pub-
lic and private action has been in flux. 7 In Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority1 18 the Supreme Court held that private conduct is normally
not sufficient "unless to some significant extent the State in any of its
manifestations has been found to have become involved in it.""1 9 State
action will only be found where "the conduct allegedly causing the depri-
vation of a federal right [may] be fairly attributable to the State."' z In
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 2 ' the Supreme Court applied a two-prong
analysis to find "fair attribution": "First, the deprivation must be caused
by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule
of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is
responsible." ' 2 State enforcement of ethical codes requiring attorney
disclosure of client perjury meets this first prong of the test. The federal
right involved is the privilege against self-incrimination, and the rules of
conduct imposed by the state are the ethical guidelines.
113. For example, Justice Powell wrote: "The area into which the Court now ventures
[lawyer advertising] has, until today, largely been left to self-regulation by the profession
within the framework of canons or standards of conduct prescribed by the respective States
and enforced where necessary by the courts." Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 402
(1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
114. See, eg., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6100, 6103 (Deering Supp. 1986); see also
Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 998 ("A lawyer who would ... cooperate [with a client's perjury]
would be at risk of prosecution for suborning perjury, and disciplinary proceedings, including
suspension and disbarment.").
115. See e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (Deering Supp. 1986).
116. See, eg., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6077, 6078, 6103 (Deering Supp. 1986); CAL.
RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 9-101 (West 1983). See generally Outcault and Peterson,
Lawyer Discipline and Professional Standards in California: Progress and Problems, 24 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 675 (1973).
117. See generally Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. RyV. 840 (1974).
118. 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (referring to state action and violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause). The state action concept under the Fourteenth Amendment
can also apply to violations of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 509
F.2d 863, 871 (1975) (investigation by New York Stock Exchange of its member firms found
not to be sufficient governmental action to invoke the sanction of the Fifth Amendment despite
regulation of the NYSE by the SEC).
119. Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
120. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
121. Id.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
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The second prong of the state action test is whether "the party
charged with the deprivation... [is] a person who may fairly be said to
be a state actor."12 3 The Court has held that "a State normally can be
held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."
124
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,1 25 the Court examined four factors often used
to distinguish a private actor from a state actor. First is whether there is
a contractual relationship between the actor and the state. Yet, "signifi-
cant or even total engagement in performing public contracts" will not
convert a private person into a state actor.
126
In Polk County v. Dodson,1 27 the Supreme Court held that "a public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing a law-
yer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding." '28 If a public defender, who has a contractual relationship
with the state, is not considered a state actor, then on first impression it
would seem that a private attorney would be even less likely to be a state
actor. Moreover, as Rendell-Baker shows, a contractual relationship be-
tween the individual and the state does not in itself create a state actor.
The second factor is the extent of government regulation of the chal-
lenged conduct.1 29 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,130 Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the majority that lawyers, like doctors, optometrists,
and utility companies, "are all in regulated businesses, providing argua-
bly essential goods and services, 'affected with a public interest.' We do
not believe that such a status converts their every action, absent more,
into that of the State." 131 Is state enforcement of legal ethical rules suffi-
cient to convert the attorney's conduct to state action? Unlike the peti-
tioners in Rendell-Baker, who "were not compelled or even influenced by
any state regulation,"1 32 the attorney is required under the Model Rules
to disclose client perjury, 1 33 a rule which is enforced by the state
courts. 
1 34
The third factor used in finding a state action is whether the attor-
ney performs a "public function[: .. .] whether the function performed
123. Id.
124. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
125. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
126. Id. at 840-41.
127. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
128. Id. at 325.
129. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
130. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
131. Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
132. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
133. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
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has been 'traditionally the exclusive perogative of the State.' "135
Justice Powell wrote for the majority in Dodson: "[A] person acts
under color of state law only when exercising power 'possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law.' ,,136 The Dodson court emphasized that
the public defender's function is no different than that of a private attor-
ney when representing her client:
[I]t is the function of the public defender to enter 'not guilty' pleas,
move to suppress State's evidence, object to evidence at trial, cross-
examine State's witnesses, and make closing arguments in behalf of
defendants. All of these are adversarial functions. We find it pecu-
liarly difficult to detect any color of state law in such activities.' 37
The attorney who discloses her client's perjury to the court is not
performing an adversarial function such as a traditional step in litigation.
Instead, the attorney violates a fundamental premise of the adversarial
process-maintaining client confidences-and produces information that
benefits the court and the state and harms her client. The court in Dod-
son recognized the public defender's ethical duty to "mandate his exer-
cise of independent judgment on behalf of the client,"' 3 8 and based its
decision on "the assumption that counsel will be free of state control."
139
The attorney who discloses her client's perjury to the court is also acting
based on her ethical duties, but which in this instance require her not to
use her independent judgment. She is required to disclose her client's
perjury. She is constrained by the threat of disbarment for violating her
professional ethical duties. She does not perform a traditional adver-
sarial function, but a prosecutorial function, which is traditionally an ex-
clusive state perogative.
The fourth factor of state action is whether a "symbiotic relation-
ship" exists between the lawyer and the state." There is a close and
mutually beneficial relationship between the lawyer and the state when
the lawyer discloses her client's perjury: the state gains highly relevant
evidence, and the lawyer is allowed to continue her legal practice. Thus,
according to both the Rendell-Baker and Lugar tests, the attorney is a
state actor under the Fourteenth Amendment. The attorney's disclosure
135. Rendell-Baker, at 842 (citations omitted).
136. 454 U.S. at 317-18 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). This
test was used by both the majority and dissenting opinions. See 454 U.S. at 329 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The "under color of law" language of the enabling acts has "consistently been
treated as the same thing as 'state action' required by the Fourteenth Amendment." United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). The Price court stated that "[t]o act 'under color'
of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a
willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." Id. at 794.
137. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 320.
138. Id. at 321.
139. Id. at 322.
140. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842-43.
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of client perjury can "be ascribed to a governmental decision"' 1 to en-
force the ethical codes.
2. Attorney as State Agent
In addition, a private attorney can be a government agent if she
functions "as a conduit for information elicited from defendant and used
by the authorities in the prosecution of defendant." '142 Thus, if the gov-
ernment uses the attorney rather than its police force to interrogate the
defendant, the attorney becomes an extension of the government's inves-
tigatory powers. This is precisely the role the attorney plays when she
discloses her client's perjury to the court 14 3 or to prosecuting authori-
ties.' Under the Model Rules, the attorney has an affirmative duty to
relay client confidences regarding perjury to these authorities. 45 There-
fore, when state courts enforce the Model Rules, in certain instances a
private attorney may be considered a government agent.
D. Is There Compulsion in the Attorney Client Interview?
Ordinarily, conversations between an attorney and her client are
confidential, and the client can freely make incriminating disclosures to
her counsel without fear of criminal sanction."16 Yet, if the attorney dis-
closes these confidences, they may be the basis for a future perjury action
against the client by the state. While an attorney might conceivably dis-
cover evidence of her client's perjury, in most instances the attorney's
knowledge will be the product of conversations with the client. Does the
attorney who discloses client perjury in any way "compel" her client to
be a witness against herself?
The Due Process Clause requires a reliable determination 47 that
any confession used by the state is "voluntary." ' 8 The voluntariness
141. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938.
142. People v. Baugh, 19 Ill. App. 3d 448, 311 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1974).
143. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
144. CANONS, supra note 5, Canon 29.
145. See supra, notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
146. Supra, note 49; see also CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-962 (Deering Supp. 1986) (lawyer-
client privilege).
147. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391-96 (1964). The defendant can testify at her
suppression hearing to determine the voluntariness of her statement without this testimony
later being available for use against her during the trial before the trier of fact. Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
148. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) ("The ultimate test remains
that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hun-
dred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker?"); United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833, 838-39 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). There is no constitutional distinction between confessions, admissions, and state-
ments by the defendant, whether inculpatory or exculpatory. Powe, 591 F.2d at 840 n.ll; see
also Iverson v. North Dakota, 480 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1044 (1973);
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requirement has four purposes: (1) to insure the trustworthiness of the
evidence, 149 (2) to preserve the individual's "freedom of will" as to
whether she will make such a harmful admission,150 (3) to deter unlawful
police conduct,1 51 and (4) to preserve the "integrity of the criminal jus-
tice system."
152
A statement is voluntary if it is "free and voluntary: that is, [it]
must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any
improper influence."' 53 There can be no "bending of the will." '154 Im-
permissible compulsion can be very slight coercion1 5 5 or the product of
physical brutality. 156 It may also be the product of psychological pres-
sure, such as mental attacks on the individual's volitional capacity. 57
Any duress renders a confession involuntary; 15  as Justice Brennan
wrote, "[T]he Fifth Amendment does not distinguish among types or de-
grees of compulsion." '159
Information divulged as the result of any express or implied promise
by the police or government agents may be deemed to have been com-
pelled.1 61 Promises of leniency or promises not to prosecute are particu-
larly likely to render a confession involuntary. Statements made as part
Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982) (confession is
"any self-incriminating statement").
149. Powe, 591 F.2d at 839-40.
150. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 581-82; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960).
151. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); see also Culombe, 367 U.S. at 586-
87.
152. Powe, 591 F.2d at 841.
153. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897); see also Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7.
154. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) ("The test is whether, consid-
ering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.") (citing
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)); Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602 (the defendant's
statements are involuntary if her "will has been overborne").
155. See, eg., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970).
156. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
157. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States,
266 U.S. 1 (1924); see also United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 551 (6th Cir. 1977) (to determine
whether a confession was voluntary, courts must "carefully sift the surrounding circumstances
to discern any signs that the statement supposedly 'volunteered' by a prisoner was actually
obtained under duress.").
Duress sufficient to render a confession involuntary need not be the same sort of duress
that constitutes the criminal defense that negates criminal culpability. Duress as a criminal
defense to the accused's otherwise unlawful conduct exists when an unlawful threat from an-
other makes the defendant believe that the only way to prevent death or great bodily harm to
herself is through such conduct. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 49 (1972).
159. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 333 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See generally Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment:
The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. Rev. 383 (1977).
160. Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
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of a plea bargain, for example, may become inadmissible as evidence at a
later trial if they were based on such a promise 161 and the government
fails to keep its end of the bargain. 62 Similarly, a person who has given
testimony under a promise of immunity cannot later have that evidence
used against her in abrogation of the agreement.
163
1. The Attorney's Promise of Confidentiality
The promise of leniency by government agents during plea bargain-
ing is similar to a lawyer's promise of confidentiality to her client. In
civil matters, the attorney may impress upon her client that success in
litigation depends on the client's full disclosure of the facts. In criminal
matters, the client may feel a heightened pressure to disclose because her
very life or liberty may hinge upon the success of the litigation. In order
to obtain all relevant information, the successful attorney will try to in-
sure that these are her client's impressions. An attorney has an ethical
duty to press her client for full disclosure of all information she may have
regarding her case and to impress upon her the attorney's duty to protect
client confidences.'" The attorney-client privilege, which excludes
highly relevant evidence from trial,'65 is based on the premise that the
judicial system is more effective if the attorney and client can engage in
frank discussions. Does this pressure affect the client's volitional
capacity?
166
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the privilege against self-incrim-
ination is more than a mere rule of evidence: it is a constitutional
right. 167 The attorney's promise of confidentiality includes an implied
161. United States v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730, 736-37 (5th Cir. 1979).
162. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
163. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
164. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 46, Defense Standard 4-3.1(a)
("Defense counsel should seek to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the
accused. The lawyer should explain the necessity of full disclosure of all facts known to the
client .... ); Defense Standard 4-3.2 (a) ("the lawyer should seek to determine all relevant
facts known to the accused."); Defense Standard 4-3.2(b) ("It is unprofessional conduct for the
lawyer to instruct ... or to intimate to the client ... that the client should not be candid in
revealing facts.").
165. The purpose of the [attorney-client] privilege is to encourage clients to make full
disclosure to their attorneys.... However, since the privilege has the effect of with-
holding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to
achieve its purpose. Accordingly it protects only those disclosures-necessary to ob-
tain informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the privilege.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
166. The general "rule [is] that a confession is inadmissible if induced by a positive promise
of some benefit by 'a person in authority.' The appellant's own counsel is not 'a person in
authority' as contemplated by that rule." Weatherly v. Texas, 477 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972). The appellant's counsel had suggested that appellant make a confession to
the authorities. The trial court there found the appellant's statement voluntary beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and the issue of voluntariness was not raised on appeal. Id.
167. Justice Brown wrote for the majority in Brown v. Walker:
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promise that the client's statements to the attorney will not be used
against her. Just as in the plea bargain setting, any later revocation of
that implied promise renders the client's statement compelled.
2. The Extortion Analogy
Extortion of information is also impermissible compulsion under the
privilege against self-incrimination.16 The attorney's threatened disclo-
sure of client perjury can be analogized to the crime of extortion. The
common law required that extortion be done for pecuniary gain.
1 69
When the attorney threatens to disclose client confidences, often she does
so because of her ethical obligation. But like Gandhi,170 does not the
lawyer also act in the hope that her reputation will rise in the eyes of her
fellow attorneys, which should have a very beneficial pecuniary effect on
her practice?
Modern statutes often do not require that extortion be done only for
pecuniary gain: in some jurisdictions extortion may be a demand for any
benefit, not just property.17' Extortion includes threats to do lawful acts
as well as illegal acts.' 72 For example, the threatened exposure of lawful
debts is a form of extortion. 173 Thus, an attorney forcing her client-
against the client's wishes-to tell the truth on the witness stand by
threatening to reveal any perjury may be a form of extortion. It is no
defense for the attorney to claim that she was acting under a legal or
ethical duty when she made the threats. When an attorney makes these
demands she requires: (1) that the defendant tell the truth, no matter
how incriminating if she takes the stand, or (2) that the defendant refuse
to testify at all. This is precisely the demand made by the defendant's
So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient [inquisitorial] system [of justice] impress
themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one ac-
cord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their funda-
mental law, so that a maxim, [nemo tenetur seipsum accusare-"no one is bound to
accuse himself," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 937] which in England
was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability
of a constitutional enactment.
161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).
168. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) ("It is extortion of information from
the accused himself that offends our sense of justice."). Extortion (or blackmail) is threatening
another with harm with the intent to cause that person to relinquish property. W. LAFAVE &
A. Scorr, supra note 158, § 95; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 525.
169. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scowr, supra note 158, § 95.
170. See M. GANDHI, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
171. See Furlotte v. State, 209 Tenn. 122, 350 S.W.2d 72 (1961).
172. See In re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130 N.W. 761 (1911), modified, 28 S.D. 420, 133 N.W.
701; People v. Eichler, 26 N.Y.S. 998 (1894), appeal dismissed meim, 142 N.Y. 642, 37 N.E.
567 (1894).
173. See, ag., 135 A.L.R. 728 (1941) (which states that the threatened exposure of debts is
a form of extortion).
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counsel in Nix v. Whiteside.174
The issue is not whether the attorney should be sanctioned for her
threats; the attorney, as in Whiteside, may merely be trying to act ethi-
cally. Instead, the issue is whether the attorney's threats are a form of
extortion sufficient to invoke the exclusionary sanction of the privilege
against self-incrimination.
3. The Confinement Analogy
Poor conditions of confinement may be sufficient to render a state-
ment by the defendant compelled or involuntary.175 Counsel for a crimi-
nal defendant may find her client in oppressive conditions. Burgeoning
prison populations and antiquated facilities may create an unhealthy and
oppressive environment for the client. These conditions may pressure the
client to make involuntary statements to her attorney which reveal her
perjurious intent. If involuntary statements of the accused are used
against her, a resulting guilty verdict must be reversed, even if the evi-
dence was never presented to the trier of fact.
176
E. Does the Client Lose Her Privilege When Discussing Perjury with
Her Attorney?
The fifth amendment privilege is not self-executing: if a witness fails
to assert the privilege when she makes self-incriminating disclosures, she
will not be able to claim the exclusionary protection of the privilege. 177
Thus, the privilege against self-incrimination generally need be know-
ingly and intelligently waived by the accused or witness. 171
An exception to the requirement of affirmative assertion occurs dur-
ing custodial interrogation, when a detained individual is questioned by
state actors.179 The justification for this exception is threefold: (1) the
state actors at a custodial interrogation are "acutely aware of the poten-
tially incriminatory nature of disclosures sought," 180 (2) the custodial
setting may be "inherently compelling",181 and (3) the accused's isolation
174. "Counsel told appellant that if he insisted upon testifying that he saw a gun, then he
(counsel) would move to withdraw, advise the state trial judge that the testimony was perjuri-
ous and testify against him." Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984). The
criminal defendant has a right to testify on her own behalf, although there is no protection for
perjury. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
175. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967).
176. United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981).
177. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984).
178. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 222-27, 235-40, 246-47 (1973).
179. Id. at 429-30. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For the other
exceptions, see infra note 207.
180. Garner, 424 U.S. at 657.
181. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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during the interrogation may be compulsive.
18 2
In the attorney-client interview, the attorney clearly understands the
incriminatory nature of her client's admissions regarding perjury. Here
the first rationale for the custodial interrogation exception applies.
The second rationale, that the custodial setting is "inherently com-
pelling,518 3 is equally applicable. The attorney may find her client in the
same setting as the police: an interview may take place at the police
station or jail while the suspect is in detention. In these locations the
accused may sense all the resources of the government being brought to
bear against her, forcing her to make a statement.
18 4
An interview at the attorney's office may be just as inherently com-
pelling."8 5 At the attorney's office, the client is compelled to make a
statement through encouragement to make complete disclosure.
Although there are differences from being in police custody-the client is
free to come and go as she pleases and there are no law enforcement
officers present-these distinctions relate to the comfort of the surround-
ings and do not necessarily prevent subtle compulsion of information. In
the privacy of the attorney's office, the attorney makes the client feel at
ease, impresses her with the importance of complete revelation of her
innermost thoughts, and reminds her of the confidentiality of the discus-
sions. The attorney intends to set aside any qualms her client may have
about revealing even her most embarrassing thoughts or conduct. The
client may hear something about the judicial protection of attorney-client
disclosures. The attorney may expressly or impliedly promise to do her
best to aid the client, as long as the client makes full disclosure of rele-
vant facts.
18 6
One could argue that at the stationhouse the accused certainly
should know who her adversaries are, 18 7 but her own attorney would be
the last person she would suspect as a foe. Yet her attorney's revelations
of perjury could be much more damaging than the accusations of any
prosecutor or adverse witness.
The third reason for the custodial interrogation exception is that an
accused's isolation during custodial interrogation can be overbearingly
compulsive. In Miranda v. Arizona, Chief Justice Warren wrote: "The
182. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n.5 (1977).
183. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
184. Id. at 456-57.
185. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 46, Defense Standard 4-
3.1(c) (steps to be taken by the attorney to insure privacy between counsel and client).
186. "A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain
confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged
to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging
subject matter." MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 comment.
187. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432; United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273
(1980). But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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[police] officers are told ... that the 'principle psychological factor con-
tributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with the
person under interrogation.' "18 Unlike the civil client, the criminal cli-
ent may feel very isolated and unable to move about at her own free will;
and if the attorney-client interview takes place at the jailhouse, the client
is in the very same isolated setting as the police interrogation.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-
incrimination requires that police officers inform detained criminal sus-
pects of their privilege against self-incrimination and their right to coun-
sel.189 Under Miranda, statements which ordinarily would satisfy the
voluntariness requirement will be excluded from evidence if these warn-
ings have not been given. While the present Court has restricted some of
the broad mandates of Miranda, particularly its remedy,19 this basic re-
quirement has not been overturned.
The Court has been unwilling to apply the Miranda warnings to
situations beyond the "inherently coercive custodial interrogations for
which it was designed." 9 ' For example, the warning need not be given
to a witness at a Grand Jury inquiry, partly because these proceedings
are secret and because the right to counsel usually has not attached. 92
In other cases a court will look at the "totality of the circumstances"
188. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449.
189. Id. at 467; see also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
190. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) ("public safety" exception to the
Miranda requirements).
191. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430 (citing Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552,
560 (1980)); see also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
192. In response to a criminal defendant's argument that his grand jury testimony should
have been excluded at the trial court because he was not given Miranda warnings, the Supreme
Court replied:
No criminal proceedings had been instituted against respondent, hence the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had not come into play. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972). A witness 'before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional
right, on being represented by his counsel .... ' Under settled principles the witness
may not insist upon the presence of his attorney in the grand jury room.
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (citations omitted).
Note that unlike the attorney-client interview, the defendants in grand jury cases are
warned, and understand their Fifth Amendment privilege prior to making incriminating state-
ments: "Q [prosecutor]: You have to answer all the questions except for those you think will
incriminate you in the commission of a crime. Is that clear? A [Mandujano]: Yes, sir."
Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 567. In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) it was
stated:
After being sworn, respondent was explicitly advised that he had a right to remain
silent and that any statements he did make could be used to convict him of a crime.
It is inconceivable that such a warning would fail to alert him to his right to refuse to
answer any question which might incriminate him.
Also, unlike the grand jury witnesses, the typical client in the attorney-client interview has not
been sworn to tell the truth. See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 582 (the "oath itself is the warning"
of possible prosecution for pejury).
when deciding whether the Miranda warnings are necessary.
193
In Minnesota v. Murphy,194 the Supreme Court held that the warn-
ings need not be given to a probationer during interviews with his proba-
tion officer. 195 Justice White, writing for the majority, examined several
additional factors to determine whether the probation setting is so inher-
ently coercive that the Miranda warnings must be given.
First he examined whether the state actor could compel the defend-
ant's "attendance and truthful answers." '19 6 The private attorney's
power to compel her client's attendance may be less than that of a Grand
Jury or probation officer. This power, however, may be unnecessary if
the client has the impression that her success at trial depends on cooper-
ating and making a full disclosure to her attorney.
Another factor is whether the questioner intends to elicit incriminat-
ing information.1 97 Both the police and the client's attorney have this
intention, and the attorney has the additional ethical obligation to learn
as much as she can about her client's case. 198 The Murphy Court also
considered whether there were observers present "to guard against abuse
or trickery." 199 The very nature of the confidential attorney-client inter-
view precludes the presence of outsiders. Another factor in Murphy was
whether the interrogator is allied with the prosecution.2°° When the at-
torney reports client perjury to the court, she assumes a position that is
adverse to her client and aligns with the prosecution by producing help-
ful evidence.
In analyzing this factor, however, a court will ask whether "absent
some express or implied promise to the contrary," the accused should be
"charged with knowledge that ... [the state actor] 'is duty bound to
report wrongdoing ... when it comes to his attention, even if by commu-
nication from the... [accused] himself.' "201 In the attorney-client rela-
tionship, there is at least an implied promise of confidentiality.
202
Moreover, because only seven percent of attorneys surveyed recently by
the ABA feel that a criminal defense lawyer should inform the court if
their client commits perjury,20 3 a client can reasonably rely on the expec-
193. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
194. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
195. Id. at 431.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976)).
198. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
199. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432.
200. Id. (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 720 (1979)); see also Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
201. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 720
(1982)) (emphasis added).
202. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 721-22.
203. Reskin, How Lawyers Vote on Tough Ethical Dilemmas, 72 A.B.A.1. 42 (Feb. 1986)
(71% would withdraw, 17% would "tell the client he/she will reveal any perjury to the court,
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tation of confidentiality. In addition, in light of the uncertainty of the
ethical codes themselves on this issue,204 even the informed client might
not be aware of the particular course of action which her attorney will
feel obliged to take.
The Murphy Court also considered whether the circumstances con-
veyed "to the suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to
the... [state actor's] will and to confess. '2 0' 5 The client may indeed have
the impression that she has no choice but to fully disclose her perjurious
intent to her attorney. The court will also examine whether the individ-
ual is in "'an unfamiliar atmosphere' or 'an interrogation environment
... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the
will of his examiner.' "206 An attorney's interview of a criminal defend-
ant may take place in the same unfamiliar environment as the police in-
terrogation or it may occur at the attorney's office, which is an
atmosphere expressly designed to create the impression of confidentiality
and to encourage full disclosure to the attorney. Under the totality of
these circumstances, the client may be able to claim the "benefit of the
first exception to the general rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
not self-executing.
20 7
A client's disclosures to an attorney are similar to those made be-
tween patient and psychiatrist, and between spouses. All three relation-
ships are afforded evidentiary privileges to enhance confidential
communications.2 °8 A patient can bar her psychiatrist's disclosures of
confidential communications. 09 The examination of an accused by a
psychiatrist provided by the state may be a custodial interrogation,
which requires that the psychiatrist give Miranda-style warnings prior to
the interview.210 A defendant can prevent her spouse from disclosing in-
criminating confidential communications. 211 A confidential confession
goaded by a spouse and exploited by the government is an abrogation of
the traditionally confidential spousal relationship and a violation of the
4% would do nothing, 1% other, 4% not sure (totals add up to greater than 100% because of
multiple responses)).
204. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3 comment; cf. note 65 and accompanying
text.
205. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433.
206. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)).
207. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434. The other two exceptions to the self-executing
requirement of the privilege involve penalties for the assertion of the privilege, id., and self-
reporting of incriminating information. Id. at 439.
208. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-962 (Deering Supp. 1986) (lawyer-client privilege);
§§ 970-987 (privilege not to testify against spouse and privilege for confidential communica-
tions); §§ 1010-1027 (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
209. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (Deering Supp. 1986).
210. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
211. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 980, 987 (Deering Supp. 1986).
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Fifth Amendment.212
The attorney who discloses client confidences to the court is an un-
witting actor in an interrogation technique described in Miranda:
In this technique, two agents are employed. Mutt, the relentless
investigator, who knows the subject is guilty and is not going to
waste any time. He's sent a dozen men away for this crime and
he's going to send the subject away for the full term. Jeff, on the
other hand, is obviously a kindhearted man. He has a family him-
self. He has a brother who was involved in a little scrape like this.
He disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange to get him
off the case if the subject will cooperate. He can't hold Mutt off for
very long. The subject would be wise to make a quick decision.
The technique is applied by having both investigators present while
Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by quietly and demur at
some of Mutt's tactics. When Jeff makes his plea for cooperation,
Mutt is not present in the room.2" 3
The lawyer plays the role of Jeff. The client may be under detention
at a jail or a police station, where everyone appears to be a Mutt. After
the Mutts have intimidated the client, the lawyer befriends her, tells her
that she will do everything she can to aid her, but that she needs full
disclosure from her. If the lawyer reveals then her client's perjury, the
Mutt and Jeff technique comes to fruition. Indeed, because the attorney
is the client's ally from the start, this interaction may be more easily
established than in the case of the Jeff who is a police officer and begins
as the suspect's adversary.
Attorney disclosure in these circumstances would be unfair and
would violate the client's constitutional right to the privilege: "[I]t is true
that both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments... reflect the Framers' intent
to establish essentially an accusatory rather than an inquisitorial system
of justice.... 2 4 The attorney-client interview is an appropriate setting
in which to require Miranda warnings before the admission at trial of the
accused's incriminating admissions that the state has garnered from the
attorney-client interview, regardless of whether the attorney actually
compelled the defendant to incriminate herself and regardless of whether
the client asserted her privilege in the interview.
212. United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1982), afid, 743 F.2d 1441 (10th
Cir. 1984). In Neal, the government was barred from using the taped conversations of confi-
dential spousal communications despite the willingness of the spouse to incriminate the ac-
cused. Id. at 947.
213. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 452 (quoting C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL IN-
VESTIGATION 104 (1956)).
214. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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F. Balancing the Client's Constitutional Right Against
the Public's Interest
In considering whether the privilege should apply in any given situa-
tion, courts will balance the individual's interest in avoiding compelled
incriminating statements against legitimate societal interests." 5 Thus,
certain disclosures that might otherwise fall within the ambit of the privi-
lege may not be protected if competing state interests outweigh the indi-
vidual interests. These interests may include the need to have citizens
report their own income for taxes216 or the importance of requiring driv-
ers to leave their name when involved in a motor vehicle accident.2" 7
With respect to attorney revelation of client perjury, the client has a
strong interest in avoiding criminal sanction for her confidential disclo-
sures. Several state interests also weigh in favor of applying the privilege.
The state has a strong interest in preserving client confidences in order to
protect the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. -18 There is also
an interest in preserving the adversarial system of justice and requiring
the state rather than the accused or her counsel to provide the fuel for
conviction.2"9 There is a need to preserve the integrity of the judicial
system and insure that convictions are based on fair conduct by the
state.220
There are also competing state interests in disallowing the perjuring
client's assertion of the privilege. The state's ease in acquiring incrimi-
nating evidence regarding perjury is enhanced by requiring lawyers to
reveal their clients' confidences. But the state's interest in criminal law
enforcement alone is always outweighed by the competing values of the
privilege.22 1
The state has an interest in preventing attorneys from participating
in frauds upon the court. Undiscovered perjury increases the potential
for an unjust verdict, and an unjust verdict means that innocent people
may be harmed and wrongdoers may go unpunished. Thus, the integrity
of both the bar and the judicial system may be compromised if attorneys
do not reveal their client's perjury.
There is also the state interest in punishing perjury. In Harris v.
New York, the Court held that the privilege does not protect perjury, and
thus in a criminal case the prosecution may use a statement to impeach a
215. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1970).
216. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973).
217. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 433-434.
218. See supra notes 165, 186 and accompanying text.
219. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
220. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (telling the defendant that she has
the right to remain silent and later using her assertion of that right against her is "fundamen-
tally unfair and a deprivation of [D]ue [P]rocess").
221. Byers, 402 U.S. at 440 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("ITihe sole governmental interest that
the privilege defeats is the enforcement of law through criminal sanctions.").
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defendant even though he never received any Miranda warnings.2 22 The
Fifth Amendment does not give the accused a right to lie.22
Yet the mere fact that a person is an accused perjuror does not mean
that she loses her constitutional rights, for the privilege is as much a
"'shelter to the guilty' "as it is "'a protection to the innocent.' "224 In
Harris, the Supreme Court did not face the issue of compulsion: the de-
fendant had freely perjured himself on the witness stand.225 By contrast,
attorney disclosure of client perjury directly raises the issue of compul-
sion. The attorney expressly or impliedly promises that: (1) that client's
disclosures will be confidential, (2) the client will not be prosecuted for
her statements to her attorney, and (3) the attorney will use her best
efforts on behalf of the client if the client makes full disclosure.
Although the general rule is that a defendant who elects to make testimo-
nial disclosures waives her privilege,226 this is not the case when an attor-
ney threatens to disclose the client's intent to commit perjury unless the
client acts in a certain manner. In Whiteside, for instance, the client had
not yet testified.227 Thus the issue is not whether the privilege protects
perjury, but whether the privilege protects a client who has made incrim-
inating statements to her attorney under the promise of confidentialty.
Such a client, whether innocent or guilty, should retain her privilege
against self-incrimination.
III. A Proposal for Disclosure of the Attorney's
Conflicting Duties
Voluntary disclosures of incriminating information to third persons
usually are not protected by the Constitution: the individual generally
bears the risk of misplacing confidence in others.228 Nor does the Consti-
tution require that an individual know whether the person to whom she
222. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
223. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969).
224. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55. Like the probationer, who "does not
lose this protection by reason of his conviction of a crime," the defendant should not lose her
privilege because of her attorney's accusation of perjury. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at
426.
225. "Petitioner makes no claim that the statements ... were coerced or involuntary."
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224.
226. See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968) ("A defendant who chooses to
testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony
he gives."); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926); cf. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at
427-28 ("Witnesses who failed to claim the privilege were once said to have 'waived' it, but we
have recently abandoned this 'vague term,'. . . and 'made clear that an individual may lose the
benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and intelligent waiver.'" (citations
omitted)).
227. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
228. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
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speaks is a government agent.229 An exception to these rules exists when
a client speaks to her attorney.230 The right to effective assistance of
counsel is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment,231 and this right im-
plies counsel independent from the prosecution.232 Further, with known
government agents, according to Chief Justice Burger, "[a]n accused...
is typically aware that his statements may be used against him. The ad-
versary positions at that stage are well established, the parties are then
'arm's-length' adversaries. ' 23 3 In contrast, the client typically is not
aware that her statements to her attorney may be used against her, nor
are the attorney and client in a well established adversary position.
While there is no right to commit perjury, there is a constitutional
right to testify implicit in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.234  No
threats from counsel' should be allowed to penalize the exercise of the
client's constitutional right to testify.235 When an attorney threatens to
disclose client confidences if the client testifies untruthfully, as in White-
side,236 or when counsel insists that the client take the stand and tell the
truth, the client has been compelled to incriminate herself. It is not
enough to say that the client can merely refrain from taking the stand:
not only does she have the right to testify, but once the attorney has
made the threat, the client probably fears her attorney as much as the
police, and may act to please her attorney. Both courses of conduct by
the attorney violate the client's privilege against self-incrimination.
The attorney-client interview compels the client to reveal her confi-
dences because the attorney makes express or implied promises of confi-
dentiality and indicates that the client can prevail in court only by
making a full disclosure. Yet even assuming that the interview is not
coercive, the client's incriminating statements- which were made in reli-
229. White, 401 U.S. at 749; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). The issue in Henry was
"whether the Government ... [had] interfered with the right to counsel of the accused by
'deliberately eliciting' incriminating statements." Id. at 272.
231. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.").
232. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), Justice Powell wrote for the Court:
This Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright ... established the right of state crimi-
nal defendants to the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against [them]."...... Implicit in the concept of a 'guiding hand' is the assumption
that counsel will be free of state control. There can be no fair trial unless the accused
receives the services of an effective and independent advocate.
Id. at 322 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
233. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273.
234. Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 225.
235. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) ("a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a[n accused's] constitutional privilege" was held unconstitutional).
236. In Whiteside, the Court did not determine "whether [Whiteside] was persuaded or
compelled" by his attorney. 106 S. Ct. at 999.
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ance on the attorney's promise and duty of confidentiality-should not
be disclosed unless the client was fully apprised of the attorney's duty of
candor to the court and the attorney's ethical obligations concerning
known client perjury.237 This disclosure should occur at the beginning of
the attorney-client interview.
Under the Model Rules, an attorney must reveal her client's perjury,
even if the disclosures derive from confidential discussions with the cli-
ent. This is inherently unfair. The very nature of the attorney-client re-
lationship presupposes that the lawyer will inform her client of her rights
to enable the client to make informed choices. But the client has no
chance to make an informed choice with respect to revealing evidence of
perjury under the existing ethical obligations of attorneys.
The government has the burden to show that any incriminating ad-
missions or confessions introduced into evidence are voluntary.238 If dis-
closure of the attorney's duty of candor is left to the lawyer's discretion,
the state cannot charge the client with knowledge of the attorney's duty
to disclose the client's perjurious confidences. Thus, the state would have
a heavier burden of showing that the disclosure was voluntary. More-
over, depending on the facts, the client's disclosure may not have been
voluntary. Requiring mandatory disclosure of the attorney's duty of can-
dor may also aid enforcement of the ethical duty to refrain from using
false evidence.
If the attorney's evidence of client perjury is to be introduced
against the client, it should be shown that the incriminating statements
were made with knowledge of the privilege and that the client has "af-
firmatively renounce[d] the protection of the privilege. ' 2 39 If the state is
unable to show that the client was aware of her constitutional rights
prior to making the incriminating statements the exclusionary rule
should bar use of the attorney's evidence against the client.2' If the state
prosecutes the client for perjury, it must show that the attorney's evi-
dence did not provide the state with a "link in the chain of evidence. "241
237. Professor Norman Lefstein has suggested that the criminal defense lawyer "inform
the client, at the outset, of the specific scope of the attorney-client privilege." Lefstein, The
Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HoF-
STRA L. Rv. 665, 692 (1978). This Note's proposal would require both criminal and civil
attorneys to disclose their duty to reveal their client's perjury.
238. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 394 (1964).
239. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976); see also United States v. Neal,
532 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1982).
240. See, eg., United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) ("The philosophy of... [the Fifth Amendment] is that no man
is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.").
241. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); see also Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
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The Model Rules should be amended to require that an attorney
inform her client that: (1) the attorney has a duty of candor to the court
that prevents her from offering untrue evidence, and (2) the attorney
must disclose the client's intention to commit perjury. This warning
would remove some of the unfairness of allowing an attorney to reveal
statements given under the promise of confidentiality.242 Second,
whether a state actor has provided a Miranda-style warning is one factor
in determining whether an incriminating statement was voluntarily
made. 4 3 This warning would thus allow the attorney's evidence to be
more readily admitted, furthering the public interest in punishing per-
jury. Third, it would address some of the concerns expressed by the
Supreme Court in Miranda and Minnesota v. Murphy, such as allowing a
person to make an informed choice concerning incriminating statements
when facing the investigatory powers of the state. Fourth, the warning
would encourage the legitimate state interest in truthful testimony: it
would encourage the client to avoid perjurious testimony by reminding
her of her solemn oath when testifying. Fifth, disclosure of the attorney's
conflicting duties is the recommended solution in any situation in which
an attorney faces a potential conflict of interest.2'
There is something strange in the image of an attorney giving her
client Miranda warnings before commencing an interview.2 a5 But is not
the very role of the attorney to advise the client of her rights? 246 Those
bent on perjury will not be constrained by the warning. But under this
proposal a client can at least make a knowing and intelligent decision
before incriminating herself by making statements regarding perjury to
her attorney. This proposal is not perfect: it may hinder the establish-
ment of a trusting attorney-client relationship, which is crucial for effec-
tive representation. However, attorney disclosure of the unwitting
client's confidences, as in Whiteside,247 may be even more damaging to
the attorney-client relationship. Moreover, when the price of maintain-
ing trusting attorney-client relationships is the client's loss of protection
under the privilege against self-incrimination, perhaps the relationship is
too costly.
242. This recommendation might presumably apply in any situation where the client's con-
fidential disclosures to her attorney are sought to be used against her in a criminal action.
243. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976).
244. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.7.
245. The Supreme Court does not require any set form in which the warning need be given.
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
246. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975) (the lawyer has a duty to inform her
client of her fifth amendment rights).
247. In Whiteside, the court of appeals presumed that appellant would have testified
falsely, for it noted that "Counsel must act if, but only if, he or she has 'a firm factual basis' for
believing that the defendant intends to testify falsely or has testified falsely .... It will be a
rare case in which this factual requirement is met." 744 F.2d at 1328.
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Conclusion
When an attorney obeys the mandate of the state's ethical require-
ments and reveals her client's perjury to the court, she has acted on be-
half of the government to compel her client to incriminate herself. This
disclosure may violate the client's fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The attorney's conduct in this specific instance is state
action, for the attorney is not performing a traditional adversarial func-
tion, but is acting for the state to prosecute her client, traditionally an
exclusive public function. The attorney compels her client to incriminate
herself by promising confidentiality. Within that promise of confidential-
ity is an implied promise that the client will not be harmed by statements
she has made to her attorney. After promising confidentiality, any later
threat by the attorney to reveal the client's confidences renders the cli-
ent's choice to testify involuntary, for the attorney's threats are a form of
extortion. Any use of the client's confidences against her is inherently
unfair.
The Supreme Court takes a balancing approach to the Fifth Amend-
ment. On the one hand are the accused's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the societal interests in preserving both the accusatorial system
of justice and the sanctity of client confidences. Weighing against these
interests are the state's interest in criminal law enforcement, the court's
need for truthful testimony, and the public's interest in the integrity of
the bar. A careful balancing of these interests indicates that if the ethical
provisions regarding client perjury are to be enforced, the ABA should
amend its Model Rules to comport with the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Lawyers should give a fair warning to their clients of the attor-
ney's required course of action. This minimum standard of conduct
allows the client the protection of the Fifth Amendment. It discourages
perjury by allowing the government to use any disclosures made. At the
same time, it allows the attorney to fulfill her ethical obligation to avoid
the use of false evidence.
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